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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Section 95 of the British North America Act, 1 authority 
over immigration into Canada is shared between the federal and 
provincial governments, with the powers of the former paramount. 
Although the provinces have from time to time directed their efforts 
at the recruitment and settlement of immigrants, 2 Ottawa has re-
tained exclusive control over immigrant selection and admission. 
During the century which has elapsed since Confederation, a con-
tinuing feature of Canadian law has been the extensive use made 
of subordinate legislation and administrative powers to control the 
flow of immigrants. As well as being few and far between,3 succes-
sive Immigration Acts have included broad regulation-making au-
thority, which has permitted the implemention and adjustment of 
governmental policy without the necessity of statutory amendment. 
To obtain a realistic picture of contemporary Canadian immigration 
law it is, therefore, necessary to examine a considerable array of 
regulations, whose practical significance frequently outweighs that 
of the legislation itself. 4 
* This article is written in a personal capacity and should not be taken to represent the 
views of the Department of Justice. 
**LL.B. (Wales) 1962, LL.M. (Yale) 1966; Barrister and Solicitor, Ontario; Consultant 
on Immigration Law; Department of Justice, Ottawa. 
1. BRITISH NORTH AMERICA AcT of 1867, 30 & 3! Viet., c. 3, s. 95: 
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the 
Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the 
Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture 
in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces, 
and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration 
shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far as it is not repugnant to 
any Act of the Parliament of Canada. 
2. Quebec is the only province with immigration legislation extant. See Immigration 
Department Act [17 Eliz. II, c. 68 (Que.)] as amended, by Bill 46, 1974. 
3. In addition to various minor acts, there have been three major consolidations of 
Canadian immigration laws: Immigration Act 1906, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 93 (1906); Immigra-
tion Act 1927, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 93 (1927); and Immigration Act 1952, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 
1-2 (1970), as amended Immigration Appeal Board Act 1967, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-3, as 
amended, STAT. CAN. c. 27 (1973-74). 
4. The more important regulations include the following: Immigration Regulations, Part 
I, P.C. 1962-86, as amended, P.C. 1966-525, P.C. 1967-1616, STAT. R. & 0. 72-443, STAT. 
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The present Canadian Immigration Act, 5 enacted in 1952, rep-
resents a further revision of an earlier consolidation undertaken in 
1927.6 The new Act did not herald any significant conceptual ad-
vances, nor did it depart from the earlier tradition that admissibil-
ity to Canada was an administrative decision, resting in the first 
instance with immigration officers and in the final analysis with the 
Minister. The magnitude of the discretionary powers which contin-
ued to reside in immigration officers after 1952 was graphically illus-
trated by the important 1955 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Attorney-General v. Brent.7 The case concerned a divorced woman 
from Buffalo, New York, who came to Canada in 1954 and estab-
lished a common-law relationship with Mr. Brent, a Canadian liv-
ing in Toronto, whom she subsequently married. At a hearing before 
a Special Inquiry Officer held shortly after her arrival but-perhaps 
significantly-before her remarriage, she was ordered deported on 
the grounds that she did not comply with the Immigration Regula-
tions in effect at that time. The regulations empowered an officer 
to classify an individual as a prohibited immigrant whenever, in his 
opinion, the person should not be admitted by reason of, inter alia: 
a) the peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding 
property in his country of birth or citizenship ... 
b) his unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social, 
industrial, education, labour, health or other conditions or require-
ments existing, temporarily or otherwise, in Canada or in the area 
or country from or through which such persons comes to Canada, or 
c) his probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume 
the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within area-
sonable time after his admission.8 
R. & 0. 73-20, STAT. R. & 0 . 74-113, STAT. R. & 0. 74-607; Immigration Inquiries Regula-
tions, STAT. R. & 0. 67-621, as amended, STAT. R. & 0 . 73-470. Of historical interest is a study 
commissioned in 1910 by the United States Government, which concluded that: 
The Canadian Immigration law is admirably adapted to carrying out the immigra-
tion policy of the Dominion. Under its terms no immigrants are specifically denied 
admission solely because of their race or origin, or because of the purpose for which 
they have come to Canada, but the discretion conferred upon officials charged with 
the administration of the law does make discrimination entirely possible. With this 
discretionary authority Canadian officials are able to regulate the admission of immi-
grants according to the demand for immigrant labor in the Dominion at the time. 
REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COMMISSION ON THE IMMIGRATION SITUATION IN 
CANADA, S. Doc. No. 469, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1910). 
5. See CAN. REv. STAT. c. 1-2 (1970). 
6. CAN. REV. STAT. c. 93 (1927) . 
7. [1956] CAN . s. CT. 318. 
8. Id. at 320. 
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The Order-in-Council establishing the regulation had simply 
reproduced the language of the authorizing section in the Act, and 
the government had in effect sub-delegated to individual immigra-
tion officers its power to determine admissibility. As a result, the 
latter enjoyed an almost blanket discretion to deny admission to 
persons they regarded as unsuitable. Since Mrs. Brent had already 
provided fairly strong evidence of her ability to become assimilated 
and it is difficult to postulate significant disparities between the 
climatic and other conditions prevailing in Buffalo and Toronto, it 
can only be supposed that the sensibilities of the officer concerned 
had been offended by Mrs. Brent's divorce and her current living 
arrangements. In quashing the deportation order, the Supreme 
Court observed that: 
. . . Parliament had in contemplation the enactment of such regu-
lations relevant to the named subject matters, or some of them, as 
in His Excellency-in-Council's own opinion were advisable and not 
a wide divergence of rules and opinions, everchanging according to 
the individual notions of Immigration Officers and Special Inquiry 
Officers. There is no power in the Governor General-in-Council to 
delegate his authority to such officers.9 
Following Brent, the regulations were rewritten to make more ex-
plicit the grounds for removal or rejection, and they have since 
undergone several revisions10 with the result that admissibility is no 
longer dependent upon the personal predilections of immigration 
officers. 
Canadian law had early adopted from the United States the 
concept of a review by a Special Inquiry Officer of any refusal to 
admit, but the 1952 Act eschewed any formal system of appeals 
against deportation orders and attempted through the inclusion of 
a broad privative clause to preclude judicial review .11 A Board of 
Immigration Appeals did exist, but its function was purely advisory 
9. Id. at 321 (Kerwin, C.J.C.). 
10. See note 4 supra. 
11. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 325, s. 39 (1952), repealed by STAT. CAN. c. 90, s. 30 (1966-67). 
No court and no judge or officer thereof has jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, 
restrain or otherwise interfere with any proceeding, decision or order of the Minister, 
Deputy Minister, Director, Immigration Appeal Board, Special Inquiry Officer or 
immigration officer had, made or given under the authority and in accordance with 
the provisions of this act relating to the detention or deportation of any person, upon 
any ground whatsoever, unless such person is a Canadian citizen or has Canadian 
domicile. 
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and final responsibility for admissions continued to rest with the 
Minister. A 1966 study12 recommended the establishment of an in-
dependent tribunal to review all deportation orders, and the govern-
ment's acceptance of this recommendation may have been 
prompted in part by the relief which it promised from the political 
and other pressures which were frequently brought to bear upon the 
Minister and Departmental officials in deportation cases. In any 
event, amending legislation13 was enacted in 1967, establishing the 
present Immigration Appeal Board. Initially the Board heard ap-
peals from all persons order deported, but there has since been a 
retreat from this position, largely precipitated by the influx of per-
sons into Canada after 1967, when it was possible to enter as a 
visitor and then apply for landed immigrant status. The possibili-
ties inherent in this procedure did not pass unnoticed by large num-
bers of would-be immigrants who were unwilling to subject them-
selves to the delays or the chances of rejection which faced them if 
they applied outside Canada for an immigrant visa. By arriving in 
Canada ostensibly as tourists, then seeking adjustment of status 
and exercising their appeal rights, they were soon assured of an 
extended stay even if they ultimately were found not to qualify as 
immigrants. As the backlog of appeals before the Board mounted, 
it became clear that this widespread abuse was seriously compro-
mising the system of immigration controls. Accordingly, the govern-
ment acted on two fronts, in 1972 removing the possibility of obtain-
ing adjustment of status14 and the following year restricting the right 
of appeal against deportation to certain defined categories. 15 
Until 1962 Canadian immigration law reflected a clear prefer-
ence for immigrants from particular regions-notably the United 
Kingdom, France, Western Europe and the United States. 16 New 
12. J. SEDGWICK, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION, Part II, (submitted to Minister of Manpower 
and Immigration, 1966). 
13. Immigration Appeal Board Act, c. 90 (1966-67), as amended, STAT. CAN. c. 27 (1973-
74). 
14. STAT. R. & 0. 72-443, Schedule, s. 2, revoking Reg. 34 of P.C. 1967-1616 (effective 
November 6, 1972). 
74). 
15. An Act to Amend the Immigration Appeal Board Act, STAT. CAN. c. 27, s. 5 (1973-
16. See D. CORBETT, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PoLicv: A CRITIQUE 45 (1967): 
The geographic bias is clearly written into the policy. The admissable categories are 
arranged by countries, and are broader for some countries and narrower for others. 
Even the classes of relatives admissible depend on the area. For some countries 
"relatives" are .broadly defined, but the definition narrows down when applied to 
India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the rest of Asia. 
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regulations promulgated in 1962 diminished this reliance upon 
country of origin in determining admissibility, but elements of ra-
cial discrimination were retained until 1967, when universally ap-
plied selection criteria were introduced. 17 The 1967 regulations 18 and 
the norms of assessment they established (the points system) re-
main the basis of the present admissions system, although, as will 
be explained, they have recently been refined and made more sensi-
tive to the economic and labor needs of particular industries and 
regions. 19 
II. ADMISSIBILITY 
A. Immigrants 
Canadian law recognizes three classes of immigrant-
sponsored, nominated and independent. Under the first category, a 
Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 18 years of 
age may sponsor for admission to Canada certain close dependents, 
including a husband or wife, fiance(e), any unmarried son or 
daughter under 21 years of age, and parents or grandparents who 
are aged 60 or over. 20 Once the requisite family relationship has 
The same study went on to observe that "selection on geographic lines is only another way 
of selecting according to race and culture." Id. 
17. See F. HAWKINS, CANADA AND IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC CONCERN 125-
28 passim (1972). 
18. STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, ss. 31-33 and Schedules A, B. 
19. See STAT. R. & 0. 74-113, STAT. R. & 0. 74-607, and discussion infra. 
20. STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, as amended, STAT. R. & 0. 74-113, provides: 
31(1) Subject to this section, every person residing in Canada who is a Canadian 
citizen or a person lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence and has 
reached the full age of eighteen years is entitled to sponsor for admission to Canada 
for permanent residence any of the following individuals (hereinafter referred to as 
"sponsored dependent"): 
a) the husband or wife of that person; 
b) the fiance or fiancee of that person and any accompanying unmarried son 
or daughter of that fiance or fiancee under twenty-one years of age; 
c) any unmarried son or daughter of that person under twenty-one years of 
age; 
d) the father, mother, grandfather or grandmother of that person 60 years of 
age or over or under 60 years of age if incapable of gainful employment or 
widowed, and any accompanying immediate family of that father, mother, 
grandfather or grandmother; 
e) any brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or grandaughter of that per-
son who is an orphan and under eighteen years of age; 
f) any adopted son or daughter of that person who was adopted under the 
age of eighteen years and who is under twenty-one years of age and unmar-
ried; 
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been established, the sponsored immigrant does not have to meet 
any additional selection criteria, and, provided he observes certain 
formal requirements, 21 the most notable of which is passing a 
physical examination, he will generally be issued an immigrant 
visa22 and admitted to Canada. Although the sponsorship provisions 
are aimed primarily at facilitating family reunification, and educa-
tion, skills and other personal attributes play no part in the selec-
tion process, a sponsored dependent is as free as other landed immi-
grants to take employment and otherwise to participate in all facets 
of Canadian life. 
With the exception of the sponsored class, all other intending 
immigrants are assessed according to norms . established in 196723 
and revised in February and October of 1974.24 In order to explain 
the important recent changes to the selection criteria, a brief de-
scription of the 1967 scheme is necessary. As already mentioned, the 
g) any child under the age of thirteen years whom that person intends to 
adopt and who is 
i) an orphan, 
ii) an abandoned child whose parentage cannot be determined, 
iii) a child born out of wedlock who has been placed with a welfare 
authority for adoption, or 
iv) a child whose parents are separated with little or no prospect of 
reconciliation and who has been placed with a welfare authority for 
adoption; and 
h) where the sponsor does not have a husband, wife, son, daughter, father, 
mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or 
niece 
i) whom he may sponsor for admission to Canada, 
ii) who is a Canadian citizen, or 
iii) who is a person admitted for permanent residence, one relative, 
regardless of his age or relationship to the sponsor, and the accompa-
nying immediate family of that relative; and 
iv) where a relative sponsored pursuant to paragraph (h) is unable to 
comply with the requirements of the Act and these Regulations or 
predeceases the sponsor, one other relative, regardless of his age or 
relationship to the sponsor, and the accompanying immediate family 
of that relative. 
21. STAT. R. & 0. 434, s. 31(2), as amended, STAT. R. & 0. 74-113, s. 2(3) . Every person 
seeking admission to Canada as an immigrant must be in possession of an unexpired passport 
or other prescribed identity or travel documents. Immigration Regulations, Part I, Amend-
ment (STAT. R. & 0. 74-321), Schedule, s. 2, revoking and replacing STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, s. 
27. 
22. Every immigrant who seeks to land in Canada must be in possession of a valid and 
subsisting immigrant visa. Immigration Regulations, Part I, Amendment (STAT. R. & 0. 72-
443), Schedule, s. 1, revoking and replacing STAT. R. & 0. 67-434 s. 28(1). 
23 . STAT. R. & 0. 67-434. 
24. STAT. R. & 0 . 74-113 and STAT. R. & 0. 74-607. 
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government in that year replaced the previous regional preferences 
with a universally applied 'points system.' All independent appli-
cants-i. e., persons with no relatives in Canada able or willing to 
sponsor or nominate them-were henceforth assessed according to 
the following numerically weighted criteria: 25 
(a) Education and training (maximum points) 20 
(b) Personal assessment (by an immigration officer, 
following an interview with the applicant) 15 
(c) Occupation~demand 15 
(d) Occupational skills 10 
(e) Age (one unit deducted for each year of age over 35) 10 
(f) Arranged employment 10 
(g) Knowledge of English and French 10 
(h) Relative in Canada willing to assist in establishment 
but unprepared or unable to sponsor or nominate 5 
(i) Employment opportunities in area of destination 5 
Total points: 100 
In order to be admissible, an independent applicant had (and still 
has) to obtain a score of at least fifty points26 out of the possible 100. 
Nominated immigrants are persons related to citizens or resi-
dents of Canada but not members of the immediate family unit-for 
example, sons or daughters over 21, brothers and sisters, parents or 
grandparents under 60 years of age and more distant relatives such 
as nephews or nieces. 27 The system established for nominated rela-
tives was essentially similar to that for independent applicants, 
except that only factors (a)-(e), above, were applied and the cri-
teria of arranged employment, employment opportunities and 
knowledge of English and French were discounted. 28 Depending on 
the closeness of his relationship to the nominator, an applicant 
might be required to obtain as few as 20 out of a possible total of 70 
points, 29 broken down as follows: education and training (maximum 
20 points); personal assesment (maximum 15 points); occupational 
demand (maximum 15 points); occupational skill (maximum 10 
25. STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, s. 32(1) and Schedule A. 
26. Id. Schedule A, s. 3. 
27. Id. s. 33(1). 
28. Id. Schedule B, s. 1. 
29. Id. Schedule B, s. 2. 
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points); and age (maximum 10 points). In other words, an applicant 
could receive, on the basis of kinship ties,30 a bonus of as many as 
30 out of a necessary 50 points. Meanwhile, the nominator assumed 
no effectively enforceable financial or other responsibilities for the 
immigrant, who in turn was not even required to settle in the city 
or region where the nominator resided. 
B. Arranged Employment or Designated Occupation 
Under the 1967 norms it was entirely possible for an indepen-
dent and, particularly, a nominated applicant to qualify for admis-
sion without arranging definite employment in Canada. Many inde-
pendents could compensate for a failure to obtain any points for 
occupational demand or employment opportunities in their area of 
destination by scoring highly in other categories of assessment. For 
the nominated class, their employment potential under (f) and (i), 
above, did not even constitute a factor in the selection system. By 
the early 1970's it was apparent that the particular and regional 
needs of the Canadian economy were not being met by an inflow of 
immigrants who were succumbing in ever-increasing numbers to the 
attractions of the major urban centres of Toronto, Vancouver and 
Montreal while chronic employment vacancies in other areas of the 
country remained unfilled. Accordingly, in February 1974 the gov-
ernment amended the norms of assessment by requiring indepen-
dent and nominated applicants to provide some evidence of occupa-
tional demand and by placing greater emphasis upon arranged em-
ployment, which was expanded to include the new concept of "des-
ignated occupation."31 The effect of the February 1974 changes was 
to tie the admissibility of both independent and nominated immi-
grants more closely to labour market needs. 
In October 197 4, this labour-demand approach was carried fur-
ther by additional changes to the Regulations. 32 Under the present 
revised points system, ten units are deductible from the total num-
ber of units received by a nominated or independent applicant un-
less he has arranged employment in Canada or is a member of a 
designated occupation.33 The "arranged employment" criterion, 
which in the past had been rather loosely applied, was redefined to 
30. Id. 
31. STAT. R. & 0 . 74-113, Schedule, s. 3 (independent applicants) ands. 4 (nominated 
applicants). 
32. STAT. R. & 0 . 74-607. 
33. Id. Schedule, s. 3 (nominated) ands. 4 (independent) . 
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operate only where the applicant had arranged "definite employ-
ment in Canada that, based on information provided by the Na-
tional Employment Service, offers reasonable prospects of continu-
ity and meets local conditions of work and wages that normally 
prevail in that occupational category," and where "based on infor-
mation provided by the National Employment Service, there is no 
Canadian citizen or permanent resident qualified" and willing and 
available to engage in that employment. 34 As an alternative to pro-
ducing a specific job offer, an applicant can obtain the requisite 10 
units if he is qualified and intends to work in an occupation that 
may from time to time be designated by the Minister as being 
in demand in a particular locality or area, and offers employment 
that has reasonable prospects of continuity and meets local condi-
tions of work and wages that normally prevail in that occupational 
category .... 35 
Although no internal controls exist to ensure its achievement, 
and, once admitted, the immigrant is free to move wherever he 
chooses, the basic aim of both 197 4 amendments to the regulations 
was to channel immigrants to those industries and areas of the 
country where manpower shortages existed. In the result, the invig-
orated factor (f) has advanced from its former insignificant position 
to a point closer to the apex of the selection system. By virtue of its 
two-fold weighting-i. e. it provides the applicant with ten points 
towards his required total, while its absence mandates the deduc-
tion of ten units from the total number which he has obtained 
under the other criteria-application of the arranged employ-
ment/designated occupation factor will in many cases now mean the 
difference between satisfying or failing to meet the requirements for 
admission to Canada as a nominated or independent immigrant. It 
should be noted, however, that in spite of the current more stringent 
points system, an immigration officer retains a discretionary power 
to approve the admission of an independent or nominated applicant 
who does not attain the required number of units if in his opinion 
there are good reasons why these norms do not reflect the individ-
ual's chances of successful establishment in Canada.36 
34. Id. s. 4(1). 
35. STAT. R. & 0. 74-113, s. 5. 
36. STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, SS. 32(4), 33(5). 
9
Hucker: Canadian Immigration Law
Published by SURFACE, 1975
56 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:47 
C. Non-Immigrants 
In contrast to the case of immigrants, whose admissibility is 
largely relegated to the regulations, Section 7 of the Immigration 
Act lists a number of categories-including tourists, 37 students38 
and temporary or seasonal workers39-under which a person may be 
admitted as a non-immigrant. As with immigrants, the legislation 
has established a general requirement that any person seeking ad-
mission to Canada as a non-immigrant must be in possession of a 
passport or other travel document and a visa. 40 However, except 
for persons from parts of Asia and eastern Europe, the non-
immigrant visa requirement has been waived by Ministerial direc-
tive. 41 Tourists from the majority of countries, including the United 
States, therefore do not now require any advance documentation 
and will be admitted to Canada upon satisfying immigration offi-
cials at a port of entry that they have made adequate financial and 
other arrangements for their stay and that they intend to depart 
from Canada upon the conclusion of their visit. 42 There is a legal 
presumption under the Immigration Act43 that every person seeking 
to come into Canada is an immigrant, i.e. that he intends to remain 
permanently-and the onus is on the person concerned to satisfy the 
immigration officer that this is not the case. Ordinarily this formal 
presumption will not be an obstacle to prompt admission as a tour-
ist, but individuals from certain areas of the world-notably the 
developing nations-have undoubtedly encountered more difficulty 
in satisfying the Immigration Department of their ultimate inten-
tion to depart. 
37. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 7(1) (c) (1970). 
38. Id. s. 7(1) (f). 
39. Id. s. 7(1)(i). The Act also lists a number of other non-immigrant categories of lesser 
numerical significance: diplomats [s. 7(1)(a)]; members of allied armed forces [s. 7(1)(b)]; 
persons in transit [s. 7(1)(d)]; clergymen [s. 7(1)(e)]; entertainers [s. 7(1) (g)]; persons 
entering to perform temporary professional services [s. 7(1)(h)]; persons entering for medical 
treatment [s. 7(2)(a)]; and persons entering under a permit [s. 7(2)(c)]. 
40. Immigration Regulations, Part I, STAT. R. & 0. 62-36, s. 28(3) (visa); and Immigra-
tion Regulations, Part I, Amendment, STAT. R. & 0. 74-321, Schedule, s. 2 (revoking and 
replacing STAT. R. & 0. 62-86, s. 27) (passport or identity or travel document). 
41. The broad exemptions were no doubt prompted in part by hopes of assisting the 
Canadian tourist industry; they also reflected a general international trend towards the 
loosening of travel restrictions, from which there has been a retreat in recent years by, among 
other nations, the United States. 
42. STAT. R. & 0 . 74-321, Schedule, s. 2 [revising Immigration Regulations, STAT. 
R. & 0. 62-36, Part I, s. 27(2)(a)]. 
43. Immigration Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 6 (1970). 
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A student who otherwise complies with the requirements of the 
Immigration Act and the Regulations will be admissible upon pres-
entation of an official letter of acceptance from an academic institu-
tion and upon satisfying an immigration officer that he has suffi-
cient funds to maintain himself, and any dependents accompanying 
him, during the period for which he seeks admission.44 A person 
admitted as a student is not permitted to take employment in Can-
ada without the written permission of the Immigration Depart-
ment45 and will not be admitted for longer than 12 months in the first 
instance, although his status may be extended for further periods 
not exceeding 12 months each as long as he remains in good standing 
at his school or college and observes the conditions of his entry.46 
On January 1, 1973, new regulations47 came into effect prohibit-
ing any person other than a Canadian citizen or permanent resident 
from taking employment in Canada unless he or she has obtained 
an employment visa.48 The institution of an employment visa sys-
tem, together with a new requirement that all visitors entering Can-
ada for a period longer than three months must register with an 
immigration officer,49 marked a departure from the previous laissez-
faire attitude towards non-immigrants. It was prompted by the 
mounting strains placed upon the Canadian labour market as a 
result of the steep rise in the number of non-immigrants entering 
Canada after 1967, who took employment either while their applica-
tions for immigrant status were being processed or while remaining 
as non-immigrants for extended periods. 
Under Section 3D of the Employment Visa Regulations a visa 
will be issued unless the National Employment Service certifies 
that there is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident available to 
fill the position.50 The visa, which will not be issued for longer than 
44. Id. s. 7(1)(f) and Immigration Regulations, Part I, STAT. R. & 0. 67-434, s. 35(1). 
45. STAT. R. & 0. 67-434 s. 35(2). 
46. Id., s. 35(3). 
47. Immigration Regulations, Part I, Amendment STAT. R. & 0. 73-20 [hereinafter 
referred to as the Employment Visa Regulations]. In announcing the new regulations, the 
Minister of Manpower and Immigration pointed out that "most developed countries employ 
a similar type of permit to control foreign labour within their borders. The United States, 
Britain and France have comparable systems." (Press Release, Department of Manpower and 
Immigration, December 28, 1972.) 
48. Immigration Regulations, Part I, Amendment, STAT. R. & 0. 73-20, s. 3C(l). Certain 
limited exemptions from the visa requirement are set out ins. 3F. Bys. 3C(l)(b)(iii), a person 
who enters Canada under a Minister's permit (Immigration Act, s. 8) is not required to obtain 
an employment visa if the permit itself authorizes him to work. 
49. Id. s. 3A. 
50. Id. s. 3D: 
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a 12-month period, specifies the nature and place of work, so that 
someone who wishes to accept a new position with a different em-
ployer must, even if he intends to remain in the same occupation, 
ensure that his visa is adjusted to reflect this change. A breach of 
any of the conditions attached to an employment visa will serve to 
invalidate it from the time the violation occurs.51 
D. Minister's Permits and Order-in-Council Landings 
In order to qualify for admission as either an immigrant or non-
immigrant, an individual must ordinarily comply with all the for-
mal requirements of the Immigration Act or any regulations made 
thereunder. Until fairly recently the ultimate responsibility for de-
ciding on admissions rested with the Minister, and an important 
residue of this discretionary power is retained in the present Immi-
gration Act. By Section 8(1), the Minister of Manpower and Immi-
gration may issue a permit authorizing the admission of any person 
for a specified period of up to 12 months. Although it may be sup-
posed that departmental guidelines govern the exercise of this dis-
cretion, they are not published. It appears, however, that a permit 
(2) Where an issuing officer receives an application for an employment visa, he shall 
issue the employment visa unless 
(a) it appears to him from information provided by the national employment 
service that 
(i) a Canadian citizen or permanent resident qualified for the employ-
ment in which the applicant wishes to engage in Canada is willing and 
available to engage in that employment and, in the case of a person 
other than a self-employed person, there is no reason to believe that 
the prospective employer will not, for a reason relating to the nature 
of the employment, accept a Canadian citizen or permanent resident 
for such employment, 
(ii) a lawful strike is in progress at the place where the applicant 
wishes to engage in employment and the employment in which the 
applicant wishes to engage would normally be carried on by a person 
who is on strike, or 
(iii) a labour dispute or disturbance other than a lawful strike is in 
progress at the place of employment and the chances of settling the 
dispute or disturbance are likely to be adversely affected if the appli-
cant engages in employment at that place; or 
(b) the applicant has violated the conditions of any employment visa issued 
to him within the preceding two years. 
The Regulations provide limited exceptions to the so-called manpower certification require-
ment of s. 3D(2), inter alia, where a person enters Canada pursuant to an agreement between 
Canada and a foreign country [s. 3G(a)], or where
0
in the opinion of the Minister the certifi-
cation requirement should not be applied "because of the existence of special circum-
stances." [s. 3G(d)]. 
51. Id. s. 3E(2). 
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will be issued in situations where the public interest or humanitar-
ian considerations justify the entry into Canada of a person who 
would otherwise be inadmissible. Frequent examples have included 
individuals who fall within the prohibited classes listed in the Immi-
gration Act52 by reason, for example, of a medical or other disability 
or as a result of a criminal conviction (It is thus the mechanism of 
a Minister's permit which Canadians wil have to thank for the privi-
lege of being able to hear the post-sentence ruminations on the 
meaning of life by various personages from the Watergate extra-
vaganza.). Admission on permit has also been employed where cir-
cumstances militate against the use of regular, more protracted, 
procedures-for example, in dealing with persons seeking asylum or 
with the victims of political upheaval, as occurred in Chile in 1973. 
It has already been pointed out that with the revocation in 1972 
of the provision under which persons could apply within Canada to 
become landed immigrants, 53 the Immigration Act no longer permit-
ted adjustment of status. Accordingly, the tourist, student or worker 
who wishes to settle here permanently must ordinarily return to his 
own country before he can apply to become a landed immigrant. 
Unfortunately, rules which tolerate no exception have a habit of 
being overtaken by events, and such has proven to be the case with 
the recent seemingly implacable decision against adjustment. of sta-
tus. Humanitarian considerations and common sense have dictated 
a more flexible approach, and a workable, if unwieldy, procedure 
has been established whereby, notwithstanding the legal barriers in 
the Act, a visitor may, under certain exceptional circumstances, 
remain in Canada as a permanent resident. A typical situation 
could arise when an immigrant to Canada of some years standing, 
who has established himself in this country and perhaps acquired 
Canadian citizenship, wishes to sponsor his elderly parents as immi-
grants but encounters some reluctance on their part to spend the 
remainder of their days in a country they have never seen. A practi-
cal solution to this dilemma is for the parents to visit Canada before 
deciding whether or not to sever all ties with their home country. 
Having entered as non-immigrants, the Immigration Act does not 
permit them to remain. 54 However, where it appears that for valid 
52. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. I-2, s. 5 (1970). 
53. See note 14 supra. 
54. Every intending immigrant must be in possession of an immigrant visa, which is 
issuable abroad: Immigration Regulations, Part I, Amendment STAT. R. & 0. 72-443, Sched-
ule, s. 1, revoking and replacing STAT. R. & 0. 62-36, s.28(1). By virtue of the Immigration 
Act, s. 5(t), anyone who does not comply with this condition-including a person who applies 
within Canada to become an immigrant-is deportable. 
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family or personal reasons a non-immigrant wishes to stay on in 
Canada, a Minister's permit55 may be issued, permitting him to 
remain for up to 12 months. If there are no additional barriers to 
his remaining, the individual's position can ultimately be regular-
ized through the conferral of landed immigrant status by an Order-
in-Council. Although a total of several thousand persons have been 
landed in this way during the past two or three years, 56 an Order-
in-Council landing remains an extraordinary procedure and is lim-
ited for the most part to sponsored dependents, where no norms of 
assessment are involved and any suggestion of line-jumping is con-
sequently not a factor. 
E. Prohibited Classes 
The perceived need to safeguard Canadian society from differ-
ent types of threat has led to the establishment and gradual expan-
sion of a number of categories of persons who are inadmissible to 
Canada. The prohibitions, which are now found in Section 5 of the 
Immigration Act, 57 are essentially a consolidation of earlier ad hoc 
legislative initiatives and, perhaps unsurprisingly, include a num-
ber of obsolete and anachronistic provisions. 58 In terms of overall 
numbers, the prohibitions of greatest significance are probably 
those against persons who are not bona fide immigrants or non-
immigrants [Section 5(p)]; persons who fail to comply with any 
conditions or requirements of the Immigration Act or Regulations 
[Section 5(t)]59; and persons who have been convicted of or who 
55. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 8 (1970). 
56. These high figures for adjustment of status via Order-in-Council landings are a direct 
result of the processing of a backlog of approximately 50,000 illegal immigrants who entered 
Canada before November 30, 1972, and whose cases qualified for consideration under an 
'amnesty' program initiated by Ottawa during 1973. See Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 11, 
1973, at 5, for a notice by the federal government, setting out the rules governing amnesty. 
The amnesty program lasted for sixty days, expiring on October 15, 1973. See Toronto Globe 
and Mail, October 24, 1973, at 1. 
57. Parallel but not identical grounds for the deportation of persons who have been 
lawfully admitted, but who have not acquired Canadian domicile or citizenship, are set out 
in the Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 18 (1970). 
58. Examples of prohibitions which have arguably outlived their usefulness or whose 
continued validity is at best doubtful in the light of contemporary social norms and medical 
knowledge include those against: idiots, imbeciles and morons [Immigration Act, CAN. REV. 
STAT. c. 1-2, s. 5(a)(l)]; persons afflicted with tuberculosis or tracho~a [s. 5(b)]; homosex-
uals [s. 5(e)]; professional beggars or vagrants [s. 5(g)]; and chronic alcoholics [s. 5(i)]. 
59. In recent years, growing use has been made of the prohibition against persons who 
are engaged in or suspected on reasonable grounds of being likely to engage in drug trafficking 
[Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 5(k)]. Also of considerably more than historical 
importance are the provisions aimed at excluding persons involved in or advocating subver-
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admit having committed any crime involving moral turpitude 
[Section 5(d)]. 
The Section 5(p) prohibition against non bona fide arrivals 
serves as a screening mechanism at ports of entry, where it is used 
to prevent persons who are intent on settling permanently in Can-
ada from circumventing the regular selection procedures by gaining 
admission as tourists and then remaining for an indefinite period, 
either through repeated renewals of their tourist status or by going 
underground. Section 5(p) is also employed, but considerably less 
frequently, to prevent the admission of persons purporting to be 
immigrants but who in fact intend to use Canada as a staging post 
in an effort to obtain entry into the United States. 
The Section 5(d) prohibition against persons who have been 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude60 entered Canadian 
law from the United States by way of the 1906 Immigration Act. In 
large part, the task of defining moral turpitude has fallen to the 
Immigration Appeal Board, which has placed on record its "entire 
disapproval" of this elusive concept. In the leading case of Turpin 
v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 61 the Board acknowl-
edged the traditional assumption that the term connoted some ele-
ment of "baseness, vileness or depravity"62 in the crime in question, 
and went on to consider whether the phrase should be read in a 
general or a particular sense. Somewhat reluctantly, it deferred to 
sive activity [id. ss. 5(1), (m) and (n)]. See in this regard the important decision of the 
Federal Court of Appeal in Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1972] 31 
D.L.R.3d 465, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada (January 28, 1975, unre-
ported). 
60. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. I-2, s. 5(d) (1970): 
[P]ersons who have been convicted of or admit having committed any crime involv-
ing moral turpitude, except persons whose admission to Canada is authorized by the 
Governor in Council upon evidence satisfactory to him that: 
(i) at least five years, in the case of a person who was convicted of such crime 
when he was twenty-one or more years of age, or at least two years, in the 
case of a person who was convicted of such crime when he was under twenty-
one years of age, have elapsed since the termination of his period of imprison-
ment or completion of sentence and, in either case, he has successfully reha-
bilitated himself, or 
(ii) in the case of a person who admits to having committed such crime of 
which he was not convicted, at least five years, in the case of a person who 
committed such crime when he was twenty-one or more years of age, or at 
least two years, in the case of a person who committed such crime when he 
was under twenty-one years of age, have elapsed since the date of commis-
sion of the crime and, in either case, he has successfully rehabilitated him-
self .... 
61. (1969] 1 1.A.R. 1, 17. 
62. Id. at 17. 
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earlier Canadian and United States precedents63 in concluding that 
moral turpitude must be given a generic meaning, with the result 
that the merits or otherwise of specific cases could not be examined 
unless they disclosed a complete departure from accepted proce-
dural standards: 
Though the Board must interpret the particular section of the Act 
before it, this interpretation must be made in the light of the Act 
as a whole. The phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' must 
therefore be taken to refer to the inherent nature of the crime, which 
will be analysed in its generic sense to see whether, in the abstract, 
it necessarily involves moral turpitude. 64 
Section 5(t) of the Immigration Act is a residual provision, 
embracing those persons who in some way or other fail to comply 
with the Act or any of the regulations. It may be used in situations 
where the individual possesses inadequate documentation-for ex-
ample he may lack a requisite visa or present an out-of-date pass-
port65-and is often employed in conjunction with other, more spe-
63. The Board referred to a number of decisions and then cited with approval (id. at 19) 
the following passage from the judgment of Noyes, Circuit Judge, in United States ex. rel. 
Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913): 
In determining whether aliens are entitled to admission, the immigration authorities 
act in an administrative and not in a judicial capacity. They must follow definite 
standards and apply general rules. Consequently, in classifying offenses I think that 
they must designate as crimes involving moral turpitude those which in their inher-
ent nature include it. Their function is not, as it seems to me, to go behind judgments 
of conviction and determine with respect to the acts disclosed by the testimony the 
questions of purpose, motive and knowledge which are often determinative of the 
moral character of acts. Besides, the testimony is seldom available and to consider 
it in one case and not in another is to depart from uniformity of treatment. In my 
opinion when it has been shown that an immigrant has been convicted of a crime, 
the only duty of the administrative officials is to determine whether that crime 
should be classified as one involving moral turpitude, according to its nature and not 
according to the particular facts and circumstances accompanying a commission of 
it. I do not think the immigration law intends that where two aliens are shown to 
have been convicted of the same kind of crime, the authorities should inquire into 
the evidence upon which they were convicted and admit the one and exclude the 
other. It is true that if they do not take such course some aliens who have been 
convicted of high crimes may be excluded although their particular acts evidence no 
immorality and that some who have been convicted of slight offences may be admit-
ted although the facts surrounding their commission may be such as to indicate 
moral obliquity. But such results always follow the use of fixed standards and such 
standards are, in my opinion, necessary for the efficient administration of the immi-
gration laws. 
64. Turpin v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1969] 11.A.R. 1, 21. 
65. STAT. R. & 0. 62-36, ss. 27, 28, as amended, STAT. R. & 0. 74-321 and STAT. R. &. 
0. 72-443. 
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cific prohibitions. 66 
The majority of the grounds for prohibiting admission to Can-
ada are applicable to non-immigrants as well as to immigrants. 
Thus, for example, a past conviction for a relatively minor offence, 
which nonetheless happens to fall within the definition of moral 
turpitude, will operate to bar the admission of the person concerned 
even for a brief visit. 67 Under the Immigration Act no discretion is 
reserved to immigration officers to relax a prohibition where the 
circumstances seem to warrant this, and an individual who falls 
within Section 5(d) or any other of the broad array of prohibitions 
-for example, those against homosexuals [Section 5(e)], chronic 
alcoholics [Section 5(i)], or "idiots, imbeciles or morons" [Section 
5(a)]-will find himself barred unless or until he can secure a Min-
ister's permit.68 
III. PROCEDURES 
Any person seeking to enter Canada must appear before an 
immigration officer, who may either admit him or set in motion 
procedures for his exclusion. 69 Where an officer, after examining an 
individual is of the opinion "that it would or may be contrary to the 
provisions of the Immigration Act or the Regulations" to admit him 
or her, he is required by Section 22 of the Act to make a report of 
his findings to a Special Inquiry Officer. From this point the proce-
dure to be followed depends on whether the individual is arriving 
from overseas or from contiguous territory. 
A. Inquiries 
In the case of a person arriving in Canada from overseas, the 
Special Inquiry Officer (S.1.0.) after reviewing the Section 22 report 
may either admit him or detain him for an immediate inquiry.70 At 
66. Section 5(t) may constitute an additional ground for deportation consequential to a 
finding under s. 5(p) that a person is not a bona fide non-immigrant. The person who is 
deemed to be seeking admission as an immigrant when presenting himself as a tourist will 
invariably not possess an immigrant visa as required bys. 28 of the Regulations supra note 
65 and so will fall into the class of persons prohibited from admission under s. 5(t) of the Act. 
67. Unless he can provide satisfactory evidence of his rehabilitation. See note 60 supra. 
68. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 8 (1970). 
69. Id. s. 19(1), (3). Under s. 19(2), every person is required to answer truthfully all 
questions put to him, and his failure to do so will in itself be sufficient ground for deportation. 
70. Id. s. 23(2). This procedure is applicable to all persons other than those arriving from 
the United States or from St. Pierre and Miquelon [id. s. 23(1)]. Inquiries may also be held 
pursuant to s. 25 in the case of persons already admitted to Canada who are the subject of a 
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the inquiry the S.I.O. must base his decision upon evidence consid-
ered credible or trustworthy by him in the circumstances of each 
case, 71 and the burden of proving that he is not prohibited from 
coming into Canada rests upon the person seeking admission. 72 At 
the conclusion of the inquiry, the S.I.O. must render his decision as 
soon as possible, either admitting the person or ordering his depor-
tation. 73 Hearings before a Special Inquiry Officer are held "separate 
and apart from the public but in the presence of the person con-
cerned wherever practicable."74 The individual has the right to be 
represented by counsel retained at his own expense, 75 and where he 
is not represented at the commencement of the inquiry, the S.I.O. 
presiding is required to inform him of this right and upon request 
must adjourn the inquiry to enable the person to retain and instruct 
counsel.76 
If an inquiry results in a finding that the person seeking admis-
sion is a member of one of the prohibited classes, a deportation order 
will issue against him.77 Even in cases of minor or inadvertant fail-
ure to comply with the requirements for admission into Canada-for 
example, arriving with an out-of-date passport-the S.I.O. has no 
discretion under the Act to withhold issuance of a deportation order, 
which remains the sole mechanism provided by the Act for securing 
the exclusion or removal of a prohibited immigrant or non-
immigrant. An administrative practice has developed whereby an 
individual may be permitted to withdraw his application for admis-
sion and depart voluntarily prior to the holding of an inquiry, but 
this remains an extralegal procedure, further weakened by a recent 
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal holding that a person may 
not depart voluntarily once an inquiry is under way.78 Accordingly, 
anyone who has not withdrawn in time or who remains intent upon 
proceeding with his application inevitably risks deportation with its 
accompanying disqualification from future entry.79 
report under s. 18 of the Immigration Act. Section 18 reports may be made when a person 
other than a Canadian citizen or a person with Canadian domicile has inter alia been con-
victed of a Criminal Code Offence [id. s. 18(1)(e)(ii)] or has ceased to be a non-immigrant 
or to be in the particular class in which he was admitted as a non-immigrant [id . s. 
18(1)(e)(vi)]. 
71. Id. s. 26(3) . 
72. Id. s. 26(4). 
73. Id. s. 27. 
74. Id. s. 26(1). 
75. Id. s. 26(2). Counsel need not be legally qualified. 
76. Immigration Inquiries Regulations, STAT. R. & 0. 67-621, s. 3. 
77. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 27(3) (1970). 
78. Morris v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (November 18, 1974, unreported). 
79. Immigration Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 35 (1970). It is now a criminal offence 
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B. Further Examinations 
The existence of a 4,000 mile border and an extremely high 
volume of traffic have necessitated the adoption of special proce-
dures to deal expeditiously with arrivals from the United States. In 
common with all others seeking admission, a person from the United 
States is required80 to appear before an immigration officer who may 
admit him or, if of the opinion that this would or may be contrary 
to the Act or regulations, must make a report under Section 22 to a 
Special Inquiry Officer. When the S.I.O. receives the report, "he 
shall, after such further examination as he may deem necessary," 
admit the person or make a deportation order against him.81 In the 
latter event, the person concerned "shall be returned as soon as 
practicable to the place whence he came to Canada."82 
An individual arriving from the United States is not entitled to 
an inquiry prior to deportation. The further examination is intended 
to operate as a review in cases where the admissibility of contiguous 
arrivals is questionable, but it differs in important respects from an 
inquiry. First, the Special Inquiry Officer possesses a discretion as 
to whether there shall be any further examination at all prior to the 
making of a deportation order; if he decides on this course, the 
further examination may be as long or as short as the S.I.O. deter-
mines. In addition, the right to counsel which is available to the 
subject of an inquiry does not extend to a further examination, 83 
even though the consequences are the same-i.e. admission to Can-
ada or the making of a deportation order. There is no requirement 
that a full transcript be kept of the proceedings of further examina-
tion, 84 and the Immigration Appeal Board has understandably held 
that the erroneous use of a further examination instead of an inquiry 
constitutes a "fundamental defect" in deportation proceedings, ren-
dering them null and void. 85 
for a person who has been deported from Canada to re-enter without the consent of the 
Minister: An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 23 Eliz.II, c. 9, s. 1 (1974). The amending 
Act came into force on December 13, 1974, and provides a maximum penalty of two years 
imprisonment for a person convicted on indictment or a maximum of six months imprison-
ment and/or a $500 fine on summary conviction. 
80. Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, s. 19 (1970). 
81. Id. s. 23(1). 
82. Id. 
83. See Ex parte Paterson, [1971] 18 D.L.R.3d 84. 
84. The Immigration Inquiries Regulations, STAT. R. & 0.67-621, s. 10, specify that "a 
full written report shall be made of the evidence at the inquiry," but no equivalent provision 
is applicable to further examinations. 
85. Belt-Y-De Cardenas v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (l.A.B. decision, 
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C. Appeals 
The Immigration Appeal Board was established in 196786 as an 
independent body with broad powers to review deportation orders. 
The Board is a court of record87 and operates entirely independently 
of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. It can require the 
attendance of witnesses and the production and inspection of docu-
ments. 88 The Chairman of the Board and a minimum number of 
members must be lawyers of at least ten years standing, but other 
members need not be legally qualified.89 The normal quorum of the 
Board is three members90 but a 1973 statutory amendment author-
ized the hearing of appeals by a single member.91 
The right of appeal against a deportation order is now possessed 
by Canadian residents, persons in possession of a valid Canadian 
immigrant or non-immigrant visa, persons claiming to be refugees, 
and persons claiming to be Canadian citizens.92 These categories 
constitute only a small percentage of all individuals ordered de-
ported and do not include, for example, the vast majority of arrivals 
from the United States. The Minister enjoys a right of appeal to the 
Board against a decision by a Special Inquiry Officer that a person 
is not within a prohibited class or is not subject to deportation. 93 
Appeals by individuals or the Minister may be based upon an al-
leged error of law, fact or mixed law and fact. 94 
In the past there was some uncertainty about the precise nature 
of immigration appeal proceedings. Until recently the Board itself 
maintained the position that, as a formal court of appeal, it was 
constrained to act upon the record of the earlier proceedings-
i. e. the special inquiry or further examination-and could not 
March 17, 1969, unreported). 
86. Immigration Appeal Board Act 1967, CAN. REv. STAT. c. I-3 (1970), as amended, CAN. 
STAT. c. 27 (1973-74). 
87. Id. s. 7(1). 
88. Id. s. 7(2). 
89. Id. s. 3. A 1973 amendment to the Immigration Appeal Board Act authorized the 
appointment of a number of temporary members, to aid in the processing of the backlog of 
appeals which had arisen: CAN. STAT. c. 27, s. 2(2)(1973-74). 
90. CAN. REV. STAT. c. I-3, s. 6(3) (1970). 
91. CAN. STAT. c. 27, s. 4(1)(1973-74). 
92. Immigration Appeal Board Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. I-3, s. 11 (1970), as amended 
CAN. STAT. c. 4(1), c. 27, (1973-74). Sponsors enjoy a right of appeal under the 1967 Act from 
a refusal to approve the application for admission to Canada of a relative Id. s. 17. 
93. Id. s. 12. 
94. Id. ss. 11, 12. The Board may order a hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer re-
opened to receive additional evidence which was not available to him (id. s. 13). A further 
appeal on any question of law lies, by leave, to the Federal Court of Appeal [id. s. 23(i)]. 
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properly hear evidence concerning the validity of a deportation 
order unless this could not have been adduced earlier or unless 
it related to a plea for special relief under Section 15 of the Im-
migration Appeal Board Act. 95 However, in a notable decision the 
Federal Court of Appeal in 1973 rejected this assumption.96 Affirm-
ing the right of an appellant to adduce before the Board evidence 
which was relevant to the question of whether he was a person 
eligible to enter or remain in Canada, 97 the Court noted that the 
earlier hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer was of an adminis-
trative nature, that it could not be assumed that the record com-
piled was necessarily complete and accurate, and that the same 
considerations applied a fortiori where the appeal was brought by a 
person deported to the United States pursuant to a further examina-
tion, in which event no full transcript would be available.98 
The Board may allow or dismiss an appeal or may render the 
decision and make an order which the Special Inquiry Officer should 
have made. 99 In addition, the Board enjoys under Section 15 of the 
Immigration Appeal Board Act certain broad discretionary powers 
which, in practical terms, have proven to be of far greater signifi-
cance than its authority to review the legal validity of a deportation 
order. Under Section 15, where the Board dismisses an appeal it 
may nonetheless stay or quash a deportation order, in the case of a 
permanent resident, "having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case," 100 or in the case of a non-resident, having regard either to 
evidence that the person concerned "will be punished for activities 
of a political character or will suffer unusual hardship," 101 or if of 
the opinion that special relief is warranted by "the existence of 
compassionate or humanitarian considerations." 102 It is undoubt-
edly this discretionary or equitable jurisdiction at which the major-
ity of appeals against deportation are in fact aimed. 103 The Board 
95. Note 86 supra. 
96. Srivastava v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [1973] F.C. 138. 
97. Id. at 149-50. 
98. Id. at 150-52. The Federal Court of Appeal also observed that the Board's own rules 
conferred upon it the right to adduce evidence and that it was a court of record with full 
powers to summon witnesses and otherwise determine all questions of fact or law (id. at 151-
52). 
99. Immigration Appeal Board Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. I-3, s. 14 (1970). 
100. Id. s. 15(1)(a). 
101. Id. s. 15(1)(b)(i). 
102. Id. s. 15(1)(b)(ii). 
103. The Supreme Court has recently held in Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immi-
gration (January 28, 1975, unreported), aff'g [1972] 31 D.L.R.3d 465, that the exercise by 
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has used its Section 15 powers in a considerable percentage of cases 
which have come before it and has attached particular importance 
to the ties-family, personal or employment-which an appellant 
has forged in Canada.1°4 
D. Judicial Review 
The Immigration Act105 and regulations106 made thereunder 
have established a detailed code of procedure for special inquiries, 
and the courts have emphasized in addition that such proceedings 
must conform to broader notions of a fair hearing. The route to 
judicial review now lies via Section 28(1) of the Federal Court Act, 107 
which empowers the Federal Court of Appeal to set aside a decision 
of a federal tribunal acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, 
whenever it is shown that the tribunal in question failed to observe 
a principle of natural justice, acted beyond its jurisdiction, made an 
error in law or acted upon an erroneous finding of fact made in a 
perverse or capricious manner. The review powers provided by Sec-
tion 28(1) do not extend to purely administrative decisions, and 
except upon proof that an Immigration officer acted with complete 
absence of good faith, it appears unlikely that a deportation order 
made pursuant to a further examination will be reviewable. 108 On 
the other hand, the courts have repeatedly asserted that a special 
inquiry is subject to review109 and must comply with the standards 
of procedural fairness that are subsumed within the rubric of natu-
ral justice. In essence this means that an individual is entitled to a 
full and fair hearing before an impartial adjudicator of any facts or 
allegations which are relevant to his deportability. 
The courts have held that the requirement of a fair hearing was 
absent where an S.1.0. refused to adjourn an inquiry in order that 
the subject could adequately instruct his lawyer; 110 where the wife 
the Board of its s. 15 discretionary powers to quash a deportation order can be precluded by 
the filing of a certificate under s. 21, signed by two Ministers, attesting that it would be 
contrary to the public interest for the Board to take such action. 
104. For a critique of the Board's approach in this area, see Janzen and Hunter, The 
Interpretation of Section 15 of the Immigration Board Act, 11 ALTA. L. REv. 260 (1973). 
105. See Immigration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-2, Part Ill, ss. 19-28 (1970). 
106. IMMIGRATION INQUIRIES REGULATIONS, STAT. R. & 0. 67-621. 
107. CAN. REv. STAT., 2d Supp., c. 10(1970). 
108. But cf. the English decision of Re K (H) (an infant), [1967] 1 All E.R. 226 (Q.B.), 
per Lord Parker, C.J.: ". . . I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not acting 
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity 
of satisfying him" of relevant matters. Id. at 231. 
109. E.g., Srivastava v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1973] F.C. 138. 
110. In re Veregin, [1933] 2 W.W.R. 409 (K.B., Man.). 
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of a person ordered deported along with her husband was not af-
forded an adequate opportunity to establish that she should not be 
included in the order; 111 and in a number of situations where the 
person concerned was not informed with sufficient particularity of 
the grounds underlying his deportation order .112 The Immigration 
Inquiries Regulations113 now require 114 that every Section 22 report 
and deportation order must set out the relevant provisions of the Act 
or Regulations which form the basis for the report or order, and the 
Immigration Appeal Board has suggested that in general this infor-
mation will be sufficient. 115 However, where a report is based upon 
a provision which could involve various charges, the Board has as-
serted that an immigration officer must set out with some precision 
those particular allegations which are being invoked against the 
person concerned.U6 
The existence of bias on the part of an adjudicator off ends one 
of the basic tenets of natural justice and will operate to nullify the 
result of the proceedings in question. In Gooliah, 117 the leading case 
on bias in immigration proceedings, Freedman, J .A., concluded that 
the S.I.O. approached the matter in question-which involved a 
conflict in testimony between the applicant and various immigra-
tion officials-with his mind made up: 
The performance of the Special Inquiry Officer on this matter was 
not that of one engaged in an objective search for truth. Rather it 
appeared to be an attempt to find justification or support for a point 
of view to which, in advance of the relevant testimony, he was al-
ready firmly committed. 118 
In setting aside the deportation order, the Court criticized the defer-
ential attitude adopted by the S.I.O. towards a senior official who 
testified at the inquiry and his hostility towards the applicant con-
cluding that: 
[p]erhaps in this case he convinced himself that Gooliah had be-
111. Moshos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1970] 7 D.L.R.3d 180 
(S.C.C.) . See also Leiba v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1972] 23 D.L.R.3d 476 
(S.C.C .). 
112. Samejima v. The King, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 246 (S.C.C .). 
113. STAT. R. & 0. 67-621. 
114. Id. s. 5. 
115. Ho Wai Hung v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1970] 11.A.C. 25. 
116. Id. See also Dos Santos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1971] 1 l.A.C. 
64. 
117. Re Gooliah and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1967] 63 D.L.R.2d 224 
(C.A.Man .). 
118. Id. at 234. 
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come disentitled to remain in Canada and ought therefore to be 
deported. That attitude may have controlled his approach to the 
inquiry and caused him, in a spirit of excessive zeal, to deal with 
the issues in such a way as to ensure the attainment of the objective 
he was seeking. Unfortunately, however, the result was something 
less than justice for Mr. Gooliah. It exposed him to an inquiry which 
fell below the standard of objective impartiality and adherence to 
natural justice which the law demands and to which he was enti-
tled.110 
There has so far been no direct pronouncement by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the relevance in the immigration context of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, 120 although there have been at least oblique 
119. Id. at 236. Successful attacks upon deportation orders, alleging that the inquiry was 
tainted by bias, have been infrequent. But see the decision of the Immigration Appeal Board 
in Janvier v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1974] 7 l.A.C. 385, a case involving 
alleged racial bias against a Haitian immigrant. 
120. The Canadian Bill of Rights, CAN. STAT. c. 44 (1960), provides that: 
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall 
continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, 
religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and 
enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by 
due process of law; 
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection 
of the law; 
(c) freedom of religion; 
(d) freedom of speech; 
(e) freedom of assembly and association; and 
(f) freedom of the press. 
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize 
the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein 
recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or 
applied so as to 
(a) authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of any 
person; 
(b) impose or authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment; 
(c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained 
(i) of the right to be informed promptly of the reason for his arrest or 
detention, 
(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, or 
(iii) of the remedy by way of habeas corpus for the determination of 
the validity of his detention and for his release if the detention is not 
lawful; 
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority to 
compel a person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, protection against 
self crimination or other constitutional safeguards; 
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indications121 that the Bill may apply to immigration procedures. 
Moreover, in a recent case122 in which a deportation order was con-
tested, inter alia, on the grounds that the appellant's right to equal-
ity before the law123 had been infringed, the Court, while rejecting 
the appeal, did not avail itself of the opportunity afforded to declare 
the Bill inapplicable to immigration. However, no would-be immi-
grant has yet succeeded in overturning a deportation order by an 
argument based upon the Bill of Rights, and whenever the Bill of 
Rights has been employed in tandem with natural justice to attack 
a deportation order, the tribunal concerned has preferred to rest its 
conclusion upon the latter ground. 124 
In two recent decisions the Immigration Appeal Board held that 
the Bill of Rights could not be enlisted by an alien to support an 
attack upon a deportation order. In the first of these, Cronan, 125 the 
Board held that since the Bill of Rights dealt with the determination 
of "rights" and in view of the fact that immigration was a privilege, 
the Bill did not govern the admission of aliens to Canada. 126 The 
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and 
obligations; 
(f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right to reason-
able bail without just cause; or 
(g) deprive a person of the right to the assistance of an interpreter in any 
proceedings in which he is involved or in which he is a party or a witness, 
before a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does not under-
stand or speak the language in which such proceedings are conducted. 
121. Curr v. The Queen, [1972) 26 D.L.R.3d 603, 611 (S.C.C.) (Laskin J.). In Rebrin v. 
Bird, [1961) 27 D.L.R.2d 622, (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court appeared to assume that the 
Bill of Rights could apply to immigration procedures although it found no evidence that the 
appellant's rights had been abrogated. 
122. Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Judgment pronounced January 
28, 1975, unreported). 
123. Bill of Rights, CAN. STAT. c. 44, s. l(b) (1960). 
124. E.g., Dos Santos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1970) 1 I.A.C. 83; 
Ho Wai Hung v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1970), I.A.C. 26. 
125. Cronan v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1973) 3 I.A.C. 42. 
126. Under the circumstances, even if the appellant had proven or could prove that 
he no longer was a member of the Communist Party and that his admission to 
Canada would not be detrimental to the security of Canada, would Mr. Cronan have 
acquired the "right" to enter Canada? The answer is no, because all immigrants or 
non-immigrants, who are admitted, enter Canada not by right but as a privilege. 
S.2(e) of the Bill of Rights therefore, which deals specifically with the determination 
of "rights" is not applicable to the admission of Mr. Cronan to Canada, which is a 
privilege. 
Id. at 80. 
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second case, Jolly, 127 involved an appeal against a deportation order 
by a former member of the Black Panther Party in the United 
States, who contended that his prohibition under Section 5(1) 128 of 
the Immigration Act infringed the guarantees of freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press found in Sections l(d) and l(f) of the Bill 
of Rights. 129 The Board reiterated the earlier distinction which it had 
drawn between privileges and rights and concluded that "the Bill 
of Rights does not apply, and never was intended to apply, to aliens 
in respect of their relationship as aliens to the state."130 The Board 
also expressed concern that to apply the Bill to immigration proce-
dures would result in "vitiating or rendering inoperative almost the 
whole of the Immigration Act. " 131 
It is suggested that the Board's fears were exaggerated and that 
its legal conclusions were questionable. By its express terms, Sec-
tion 2 of the Bill of Rights 132 requires that "every law of Can-
ada"-including, presumably, the Immigration Act-shall be con-
strued and applied so not as to abrogate or abridge the rights enu-
merated therein. It therefore appears that in Jolly the Board con-
fused two separate questions: first, is the Bill of Rights as a legisla-
tive instrument applicable to the Immigration Act, and secondly, if 
so, do the guarantees contained therein operate to invalidate a de-
portation order based on Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act? If the 
issue is posed in this way it becomes necessary to examine the 
precise nature and reach of the particular guarantees contained in 
the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has indicated that the rights 
listed in Section 1 are by necessary implication incorporated into 
the canon of construction established by Section 2. 133 However, Sec-
127. Jolly v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (March 4, 1974, unreported). The 
case is now on appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. 
128. Immigration Act, CAN. STAT. c. 44, s. 5(1) (1960): 
[P]ersons who are or have been, at any time before, on or after the 1st day of June 
1953, members of or associated with any organization, group or body of any kind 
concerning which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it promotes or 
advocates or at the time of such membership or association promoted or advocated 
subversion by force or other means of democratic government, institutions or pro-
cesses, as they are understood in Canada, except persons who satisfy the Minister 
that they have ceased to be members of or associated with such organizations, groups 
or bodies and whose admission would not be detrimental to the security of Canada. 
129. See note 120 supra. 
130. Jolly v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration at 9 (March 4, 1974, unreported). 
131. Id. at 12. 
132. Supra note 120. 
133. Curr v. The Queen, [1972] 26 D.R.L.3d 603, 611 (Laskin J.). 
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tion 1 refers specifically to the enjoyment of rights "in Canada," and 
it is arguable that in deporting the appellant in Jolly for his past 
association with the Black Panthers in the United States, his posi-
tive right to freedom of association in Canada was in no way abro-
gated. 
A resident alien will undoubtedly enjoy the benefits of the Bill 
of Rights in his other legal relationships and there seems no a priori 
reason why this protection should suddenly lapse the moment his 
alien status comes into issue. The legal position of an individual 
seeking admission for the first time at a port of entry is ambiguous. 
Although he is physically present in Canada from the moment he 
drives across the border or steps off the plane (in fact, he may be 
within Canadian jurisdiction prior to disembarking), he is not law-
fully "admitted" until he has complied with all immigration re-
quirements, including any necessary examination. To suggest, how-
ever, that the procedures which may be invoked to exclude him from 
Canada need not conform to community expectations as embodied 
in the Bill of Rights seems unwarranted. 134 
IV. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 
In early 1975, the federal government published its long-
awaited Green Paper135 on immigration. Ottawa had earlier indi-
cated that although reform of the immigration laws was an item 
fairly high on its list of priorities, future legislative change would 
take place in the context of a comprehensive reassessment of Can-
134. This is not to suggest that persons outside of Canada-e.g., overseas applicants for 
visas-could invoke the Bill of Rights in support of any claim to admissibility. In the impor-
tant case of Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (January 28, 1975, unreported), 
which involved an appeal against a deportation order, the government filed a certificate under 
s. 21 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act precluding the Board from exercising its discre-
tionary powers to quash and direct the grant of landing. The s. 21 certificate is issued under 
the signature of two Ministers in situations where in their opinion "based upon security or 
criminal intelligence reports" it would be contrary to the national interest for the Board to 
exercise its s. 15 discretion. The appellant, who had not been informed of the substance of 
these reports, argued that he had been denied a hearing before the certificate was made and 
that issuance of the certificate denied him equality before the law under s. l(b) of the Bill of 
Rights. His claim was rejected by the Supreme Court, which, however, did not suggest that 
the Bill of Rights argument was inappropriate or that the issues involved fell totally outside 
the Bill's purview. 
135. A REPORT OF THE CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION STUDY, IMMIGRATION POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES (Vol. 1); THE IMMIGRATION PROGRAM (Vol. 2); IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION STA-
TISTICS (Vol. 3); THREE YEARS IN CANADA-FIRST REPORT OF THE LONGITUDINAL SURVEY ON THE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADAPTATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Vol. 4) (Publication date, December 1, 
1974). The term "Green Paper" is used to refer to the study as a whole, although public 
debate has centered on Vol. 1, which summarizes most of the fundamental issues. 
27
Hucker: Canadian Immigration Law
Published by SURFACE, 1975
74 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:47 
ada's demographic goals. The Green Paper was therefore intended 
to serve as a catalyst for a public debate which in turn would lead 
to the formulation of an appropriate Canadian immigration policy 
for the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
The government's study located the present law in its socio-
historical context and posited alternative approaches which might 
be considered for future adoption. Although it did not commit the 
government to any particular course of action, the tone of the Green 
Paper undoubtedly marked a departure from Canada's earlier ex-
pansionist philosophy towards immigration. 136 It emphasized "the 
need to study ways to introduce into the immigration program 
mechanisms that will permit confident long-term planning about 
the size and other characteristics of the flow of immigrants to this 
country, in order to ensure that it is in harmony with national demo-
graphic objectives as these are developed at many levels." 137 The 
report touched rather gingerly upon the changes in the composition 
of immigrants to Canada in recent years, noting that between 1966 
and 1973 the proportion of immigrants from Europe had fallen from 
76 to 39 per cent of the annual flow, while during the same period 
Asia's share of the movement had climbed from 6 to 23 percent.138 
Also noted was a rise in the proportion of immigrants from the 
sponsored and nominated categories (particularly the latter), a 
downward trend in the overall skill level and the accentuation of 
uneven patterns of immigrant settlement in Canada.139 Various pol-
icy alternatives were non-committally canvassed, including gearing 
the immigration program even more intensively than at present to 
economic and labour market objectives (and, by implication, bring-
ing to an end the nominated category of immigrant), introducing 
some form of quota system which would place limits on the number 
of visas issued annually, or establishing an overall global ceiling for 
the total immigration movement. 140 
Some of what is said, and a great deal of what is left unsaid, in 
the Green Paper has implications for any new immigration law. 
Most notably, the effective implementation of demographic goals 
could involve the introduction of a system whereby the admission 
of an individual might be made conditional upon his settling in a 
136. Id. IMMIGRATION POLICY PERSPECTIVES, (Vol. 1), at 26. 
137. Id. at 12. 
138. Id. at 32. 
139. Id. at 32-33. 
140. Id. at 42-45. 
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designated area of the country; after a period of time, upon proof 
that a permanent residence had been established, his status could 
be adjusted to that of landed immigrant. Clearly, such an approach, 
which would constitute a restriction on the basic right of freedom 
of movement within Canada, poses serious questions of legal princi-
ple and enforcement. 
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the Green Paper consulta-
tions and debate, certain aspects of existing legislation seem ripe for 
change. For example, the present distribution between statute and 
regulations does not reflect the generally accepted goal that the 
major legislative instrument should contain all matters of principle, 
with only administrative detail left to subsidiary legislation. Such 
can hardly be the position when the substantive requirements for 
admission as an immigrant are found nowhere in the Immigration 
Act. 
Deportation, which carries with it a permanent prohibition 
against re-entry (except by way of a Minister's permit) is the only 
technique now available for excluding or removing a person from 
Canada. Existing legislation does not distinguish between serious 
criminals, persons who are prohibited from admission on medical 
grounds or persons who fail to comply with a technical requirement 
such as possession of a passport or a visa. While deportation should 
probably be retained for use in more serious cases, less drastic proce-
dures could with advantage be developed to cover situations of 
minor or technical noncompliance with the Act or regulations. 
Thus, use might be made in appropriate circumstances of some sort 
of exclusion order which does not prejudice the right of the person 
concerned to re-apply for admission. At the same time, thought 
might appropriately be given to rationalizing the present grounds 
for prohibiting admission to Canada and particularly to removing 
the more striking anachronisms in this area. 
With the experiences of 1967-73 still fresh in the government's 
mind, any expansion of appeal rights in the near future seems un-
likely. However, the present law requires an attack upon the legal 
validity of a deportation order as a precondition to the exercise by 
the Immigration Appeal Board of its discretionary power to order 
admission or landing. This circuitous and illogical procedure could 
be simplified by the establishment of separate appeal routes which 
distinguish between legal and humanitarian considerations. 
With the curtailment of appeal rights in 1973, the inquiry re-
gained its place as the key component in the review process. The 
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inquiry system has not, however, escaped criticism. In particular, 
suggestions have been made that the Special Inquiry Officer should 
be more effectively insulated from the regular examination function 
and that hearings should assume more of the qualities of an adver-
sarial proceeding. The danger in the latter suggestion is that to work 
effectively an adversary system requires an even balance of exper-
tise between the parties. Such would not be the case unless immi-
grants were provided with lawyers or a competent corps of non-
lawyers to represent them at hearings. Absent this safeguard, an 
increased formalism is likely to provide only illusory protection for 
the person concerned. 
The pressure point in the present control system remains the 
port-of-entry, where immigration officers and S.1.0.'s must pro-
nounce upon admissibility under less than ideal circumstances. 
Where questions of intention arise, decisions are necessarily based 
upon impressionistic indicators and can engender understandable 
resentment from the visitor who is unable to satisfy a Special 
Inquiry Officer of his bona fides. The United States has for many 
years operated a comprehensive visa system in an attempt to effec-
tively pre-screen visitors as well as immigrants. Undoubtedly such 
an approach has advantages, although it remains to be seen whether 
these outweigh the consequential inconveniences to the traveller as 
well as the additional costs which would undoubtedly be involved. 
The present Canadian Immigration Act dates only from 1952, 
but its governing assumptions and conceptual framework can be 
traced back to the turn of the century. The need to respond to 
changing domestic and international conditions and to meet partic-
ular exigencies has resulted in the accretion of a largely shapeless 
mass of prescriptions with no clear unifying thread. Whatever form 
it may finally take, it is hoped that any new Immigration Act will 
be framed in the light of objectives which are clearly defined and 
future oriented, but whose macrocosmic focus does not overlook the 
continued need for individual safeguards. 
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